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STRIKING A BALANCE IN THE VALUATION OF
TEMPORARY TAKINGS: EXAMINING THE AWARD OF
LOST PROFITS IN PRIMETIME HOSPITALITY, INC. V.
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE
TARA KINMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque determined that an award of
lost profits was recoverable as a measurement of loss in inverse condemnation
under New Mexico law.1 The Plaintiff hotel developer, Primetime Hospitality, Inc.
(Primetime), was in the process of building a hotel when one of its contractors
struck and ruptured a water line, flooding the property.2 The contractors were unable to resume construction for 142 days as a result of the flooding, causing a substantial loss of profits from the delayed opening of the hotel.3 Because the City of
Albuquerque (City) stipulated to liability for a temporary taking in the inverse
condemnation action due to its misplacement of the water lines, the only issue
before the court was to determine the correct measure of damages to award to
Primetime to justly compensate its loss.4 The district court awarded Primetime the
profits that it lost during the period of delay and the additional construction costs
it incurred from the flooding.5 The City appealed the case to the court of appeals,
which reversed the district court’s award of lost profits.6 Primetime then appealed
to the New Mexico Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the award of lost profits.7
The award of lost profits in Primetime was particularly significant to New Mexico takings law because lost profits are consequential damages, which have traditionally been precluded as a recoverable damage in takings cases.8 Although the
supreme court did expand New Mexico takings law in considering lost profits as a
method of valuation in Primetime, the decision is unlikely to impact takings awards
significantly because the holding was limited by the Court’s reliance on the unchallenged findings of the district court and the characterization of the lost profits as a
“non-consequential” damage.9 In providing this limited holding, the court continued to adhere to an antiquated notion of aversion to consequential damages. This
adherence fails to fully compensate condemnees and prevents certainty in the valuation of damages for condemnation. This note will examine the reasoning behind

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2011. The author thanks Professor Robert
Desiderio, Professor Michael Browde, Hajra Malik, Erin McSherry, Amanda Connor, and David Ferrance for
their valuable advice, assistance, and support.
1. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 1, 206 P.3d 112, 114.
2. Id. ¶ 4, 206 P.3d at 114.
3. Id. ¶ 6, 206 P.3d at 115.
4. See id. ¶ 5, 206 P.3d at 115. One possible issue of contention with the case is whether a temporary
taking was actually effected by the misplacement of the waterlines by the City at all, thereby requiring compensation to Primetime. However, because the City stipulated to liability for a temporary taking in the early
stages of the case, that issue was not litigated and is therefore outside the scope of the case and this note.
5. Id. ¶ 6, 206 P.3d at 115; see also infra Part III.B.
6. See id. ¶ 8, 206 P.3d at 115; see also infra Part III.C.
7. See id. ¶ 8, 206 P.3d at 115–16; see also infra Part III.D.
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
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the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision to award lost profits in Primetime and
will provide recommendations for the future treatment of lost profits in inverse
condemnation.
Part II lays the foundation of takings jurisprudence, first discussing the general
facets of takings law as established in the federal courts, including the differences
between traditional and inverse condemnation. Second, the Part discusses various
measurement methods that have been employed by the courts. Third, the Part discusses the availability of consequential damages in takings cases, specifically with
respect to lost profits. Part II concludes with an examination of the measurement
of temporary takings in New Mexico and the development of New Mexico precedent up to Primetime.
Part III examines the Primetime case, tracking the procedural route of the case
up to the supreme court. This part concludes with a discussion of the supreme
court’s reasoning and holdings of the case.
Part IV provides an analysis of the case, including the implications of the award
of lost profits and an analysis of the court’s reasoning. In addition, the analysis
provides recommendations for the future of New Mexico’s treatment of lost profits
in condemnation actions, including characterizing lost profits awards as consequential and allowing their recovery when they meet the normal limitations on
consequential damages.
Part V concludes the note, discussing the future of New Mexico takings law as a
result of the precedent set in Primetime.
II. BACKGROUND OF TAKINGS LAW AND DAMAGES
RECOVERABLE UNDER TAKINGS
A. Takings Law Generally
Federal takings jurisprudence has developed around the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause that requires private property not be taken for public use without just
compensation.10 New Mexico has adopted a similar takings provision in its state
constitution.11 Property ownership is considered to include “a bundle of rights”
that convey the right to the owner to use, dispose of, and handle his property in
whatever manner he desires.12 Therefore, when the government interferes with
these fundamental property rights by restricting the owner’s use of the property
for public benefit, even temporarily, there must be compensation for the deprivation of the right.13

10. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). “Just compensation” is not explicitly defined in the Fifth Amendment, but has been construed as
intending to place the condemnee in as good of a position, but no better, than he would have been had the
taking not occurred. 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 12.01 (3d ed. 1997); see also infra Part II.B.
11. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20, (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.”); Bd. of Educ., Moriarty Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Thunder Mountain Water Co., 2007-NMSC031, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 869, 872 (“[The New Mexico] state Constitution provides similar protection” to the U.S.
Constitution’s Takings Clause.).
12. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.01(4).
13. Id.; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
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1. Traditional Condemnation
Two types of condemnation exist, traditional condemnation14 and inverse condemnation.15 Traditional condemnation cases arise out of a governmental entity,
also known as the condemnor,16 physically seizing or “taking” property from a condemnee17 for public use.18 The government condemns the property by initiating
formal statutory condemnation proceedings.19 The government is required to pay
just compensation for the taking of the property, usually calculated by the fair
market value of the land.20 Condemnation essentially results in a forced sale of the
property from the owner to the government.21 However, because the government
does not always initiate condemnation proceedings before taking property, takings
law has expanded beyond traditional condemnation to recognize inverse
condemnation.22
2. Inverse Condemnation
Inverse condemnation has developed in takings law to include governmental
interference with property rights, expanding beyond traditional condemnation,
which only allows compensation when the property is physically taken by the government in formal condemnation proceedings.23 A cause of action lies in inverse
condemnation when the property or a portion of the property is taken in fact by an
action of the government, but the government has not instituted formal condemnation proceedings.24 The primary difference between the two types of condemnation
is that the owner of the property brings the cause of action against the government
for the inverse condemnation of a portion or all of their property, while the government institutes formal condemnation proceedings.25 Inverse condemnation can
arise in many different ways. One common example is a regulatory taking in which
an owner’s use of his property is deprived due to a government regulation that is
later invalidated for failing to advance a legitimate state interest.26 Another way a
cause of action in inverse condemnation arises is when the government causes a
temporary physical invasion of land that deprives the property owner the use of his
14. Condemnation is defined as “[t]he determination and declaration that certain property (esp. land)
is assigned to public use, subject to reasonable compensation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (9th ed. 2009).
Condemnation is also referred to as the exercise of eminent domain by the government, defined as “[t]he
inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public
use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.” Id. at 332, 601.
15. Inverse condemnation is defined as “[a]n action brought by a property owner for compensation
from a governmental entity that has taken the owner’s property without bringing formal condemnation proceedings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (9th ed. 2009).
16. A condemnor is defined as “[a] person or entity that expropriates property for public use.” Id.
17. A condemnee is defined as “[o]ne whose property is expropriated for public use or taken by a
public-works project.” Id.
18. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 1 (2007).
19. See id.
20. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12.02.
21. See generally id. § 12.02(1) (Fair market value is “the amount of money which a purchaser willing,
but not obliged, to buy the property would pay to an owner willing, but not obliged, to sell it”).
22. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 559 (2007).
23. See Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 303–309 (1991).
24. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 559 (2007).
25. Id. § 1.
26. Id. § 6.
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property.27 This type of taking, known as a temporary physical taking, was the type
of taking at issue in Primetime.28
One difficult issue that arises with inverse condemnation involves valuing the
loss of the use and enjoyment of property when an owner still physically has title to
the property in his possession.29 A number of methods of valuation have emerged
and have been employed by the courts.30
B. Measurement of “Just Compensation”
Under both the U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions, the general requirement
for compensating all categories of takings requires that the owner receive “just
compensation.”31 This measure is required in takings because the right to own
property is a historically protected constitutional right.32 The right to just compensation was included in the constitution in response to an aversion to governmental
acquisition of these important property rights without compensation.33 “Just compensation” is not explicitly defined in the Fifth Amendment, but has been construed as intending to place the condemnee in as good of a position, but no better,
than he would have been had the taking not occurred.34 Under the just compensation doctrine, condemnees are entitled to the full value of their property at the
time it is taken,35 but are generally not entitled to recover incidental or consequential losses.36 The goal of just compensation is to achieve a measure that is fair
to both the public who will pay for the property through taxation, and to the condemnee who deserves to be compensated for the full value of what he has lost.37
In achieving this balance, there are three potential vantage points from which
valuation of taken property can be measured: (1) value to the condemnee, (2)

27. Id. § 148.
28. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 1, 206 P.3d 112, 114.
29. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 15, 168 P.3d 1087, 1092.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20.
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“All persons are born equally free, and have
certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of . . . acquiring, possessing and
protecting property. . . .”).
33. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.01(2) (“It is now well settled law in every part of the United States
that when private property is taken by eminent domain the owner of the property is constitutionally entitled to
compensation”). For further discussion on the fundamental right to compensation, see Section 8.01(1) of Nichols on Eminent Domain.
34. Id. § 12.01; see also United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (“The guiding
principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the owner for the property interest taken. ‘He is entitled to
be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is
not entitled to more.’” (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))).
35. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12A.02.
36. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 59 (3d ed. 2002).
37. The tension between fully compensating a condemnee and preventing the taxpayer from extensive
liability is described in Nichols on Eminent Domain:
[C]ompensation should be just to the condemnor as well as the condemnee . . . :
On the one hand it contemplates that the monies paid into the common Treasury by the
taxpayers shall be jealously guarded as a public trust against unfounded and unjust claims.
On the other, it guarantees that the Government, having regard for the rights and welfare of
its citizens and respect for the restraints on its authority, shall deal fairly and equitably with
each of them.
3 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.06(1) (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Land, 131 F. Supp. 443, 445
(D.D.C. 1955)).
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value to the taker, or (3) fair market value.38 The first method, value to the condemnee, measures the value from the standpoint of what the property owner has
lost.39 The condemnee’s subjective view of the value of his property is generally
rejected as a valuation measure, unless there is no ascertainable market value because of the special nature of the property.40
Second, value to the taker is a measurement of what the property is worth to the
government based on the purposes for which it is taken.41 Value to the taker is
ordinarily rejected as a valuation measurement.42 However, this valuation is allowed in certain circumstances where the value of the property for the taker’s projected use is a determinative factor in determining its market value.43
Third, fair market value is “the amount of money which a purchaser willing, but
not obliged, to buy the property would pay to an owner willing, but not obliged, to
sell it.”44 This measure is considered to be the best valuation point because it seeks
to achieve a fair balance between the public and the condemnee by providing a
measurement of the property for sale in the market.45 Therefore, fair market value
is usually considered to be the best valuation method of the three.46
Although fair market value is the preferred measure for valuing takings, courts
have provided flexibility for situations in which it does not provide appropriate
compensation.47 The other two methods of valuation, based on the point of view of
the taker or the condemnee, are used only in circumstances in which fair market
value cannot provide a just measurement.48 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
courts should provide working measurements to fit the circumstances of different
cases, and a deviation from the market value approach is appropriate when market
value is not ascertainable and would not provide compensation that is “just.”49
Similarly, New Mexico adheres to the fair market value approach for valuing tak-

38. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12.01(5).
39. Id.
40. Id. Although the fair market value is generally considered from the vantage point of the condemnee, pure subjective values are generally rejected. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 12.02(1). This measurement is taken from the standpoint of the value of the property before
any damage or decrease resulted from consequences of the taking. See id. § 12A.02.
45. Id. § 12.02; see also United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402
(1949) (The market measure of compensation achieves a fair “balance between the public’s need and the
claimant’s loss.”).
46. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1984) (noting, in a case regarding a permanent physical taking, that “[t]he Court has repeatedly held that just compensation is normally to be measured
by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money.’” (quoting
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))).
47. United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (“[Market value] is not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of valuation [in condemnation cases].”); see also 50 Acres of Land, 469
U.S. at 29 (“Deviation from [market value] has been required only ‘when market value has been too difficult
to find, or when its application would result in manifest justice to the owner or public.’” (quoting United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950))).
48. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12.01(5).
49. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1979). The Constitution does not
require any specific method of valuation, and while fair market value does provide a useful tool for an objective measure of damages, courts have recognized that it will not equate to “just” compensation in every situation. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12.01.
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ings generally, but has also provided that flexibility for certain circumstances is
permissible to fully compensate the property owner based on what he has lost.50
C. Measurement of Damages in Temporary Takings51
In traditional condemnation, a full market value award is usually appropriate
because the owner has lost the land that was physically taken by the government.52
However, in temporary takings, the loss that occurs is not of the entire title to the
property.53 Therefore, a full market value award would be inappropriate as it is
much greater than the value of what the plaintiff has actually lost.54 It therefore
becomes necessary to define the actual loss that the condemnee suffers when he is
deprived of the use or benefit of his property for a period of time, but ultimately
regains his property rights. The nature of this loss is generally the loss of the use of
the property for the time period of the taking or any loss of value in the property
during the period of the taking.55
Valuing this loss can be a more difficult measurement to obtain than the full fair
market value used in valuing traditional condemnation cases.56 The next section
will discuss various approaches the courts have employed in valuing the loss of use
and enjoyment of property. Different approaches have been used by the courts to
value a temporary taking including: (1) the market rental approach, (2) the before
and after approach, and (3) the economic loss approach.57
1. Market Rental Value Approach
The market rental value approach awards the condemnee the fair market rental
value of his land that could likely be obtained during the period of the taking.58
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that market rental value is the most appropriate approach for valuing temporary takings involving business losses because the loss to the condemnee is the value of the use of the premises during the
taking, which normally can be determined by its market rental value.59 However,
the rental value of the property may not always provide just compensation in situations in which “a greater interest has, in fact, been taken.”60

50. See State ex rel. Highway Comm’n v. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 558–59, 417 P.2d 46, 49–50 (1966)
(citing 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.314 (2d ed. 1917)).
51. For the purposes of this article, only the measures of damages for temporary takings of property
will be discussed at length, as this was the type of taking at issue in Primetime.
52. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12.02.
53. Id. § 12E.01.
54. See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 148 (2007).
55. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12E.01.
56. See Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 15, 168 P.3d 1087,
1092.
57. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12E.01. For the purposes of this note, only measurements of temporary takings of land used for business premises will be discussed, as this was the type of taking at issue in
Primetime.
58. Id.
59. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949).
60. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12E.01.
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2. Before and After Approach
Another approach to valuing temporary takings of land is the before and after
approach. Before and after valuation awards the condemnee the difference in the
market value of the land immediately before the taking occurred and the value
after the taking has occurred.61 The before and after approach is also called the
“diminution in value” approach because it measures the decrease in the value of
the property that results from the governmental interference.62 However, the
before and after approach provides no damages when the market value of the land
does not decrease during the time period of the taking, which often is the case in
physical temporary takings.63 The before and after approach is generally better
suited for regulatory takings than it is for physical temporary takings. This is due to
the fact that regulatory takings decrease the value of land as a result of the government’s temporary regulation, whereas the government’s physical occupation of the
land through temporary takings does not decrease the market value of the land.64
3. Economic Loss Approach
The economic loss approach awards condemnees the loss of the economic value
of their property, measured by lost profits or “going-concern value.”65 A lost profits measure is the valuation of profits that the condemnee can show to have been
definitely and certainly lost as a result of the taking.66 The going-concern value “is
the price a willing buyer and seller would accept in [a] free marketplace for the
business in question.”67 These measures are different ways of measuring the loss of
a business that existed on premises that are condemned.68
Generally economic loss is not considered to be compensable under the requirement of just compensation.69 Therefore these losses are usually not considered,
although they have been allowed in the federal courts in temporary takings where
one of the other two methods would not provide an adequate award. Additionally,
some state jurisdictions have taken steps to allow their recovery in takings cases.70
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Respondent’s Answer Brief at 1, Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque,
2009-NMSC-011, 206 P.3d 112 (No. 30,543), available at 2008 WL 6487112 (modifying argument on appeal
from advocating for a before and after measurement of value because it recognized that the measure was not
“wholly adequate to measure the actual condemnation loss of Primetime” in a temporary physical taking
case).
64. See generally 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12E.01 (regarding temporary regulatory takings); NMSA
1978, § 42A-1-26 (1981) (requiring a before and after measurement when the government condemns a portion
of a piece of property under the New Mexico Eminent Domain Code).
65. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Elements and Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain Proceeding for Temporary Taking of Property, 49 A.L.R.6th 205, 255–59 (2009).
66. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 12E.01 (“Although potential profits, as a general proposition, are to be
ignored as speculative and conjectural, it has been held that present value of future earnings that are definite
and certain may be considered.”).
67. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 13.13(2) (quoting Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co.,
734 F.2d 133, 148 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1949).
Going-concern value is defined as “[t]he value of a commercial enterprise’s assets or of the enterprise itself as
an active business with future earning power, as opposed to the liquidation value of the business or of its
assets.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1691 (9th ed. 2009).
68. See Kemper, supra note 65, at 255–59.
69. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 13.13(1).
70. See, e.g., Kimball, 338 U.S. at 20; see also infra Part II.D.3.
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D. Availability of Consequential Damages in Condemnation Actions
Consequential damages are traditionally precluded as direct awards in takings.71
As background for the following sections, this section will address the distinction
between general and consequential damages, and the reason and rationale for the
preclusion of consequential damages in takings cases.
1. Consequential Damages Versus General Damages
General damages are those that flow directly from the injury and can be readily
proven as a direct result of the harm.72 Specifically with respect to land, general
damages are those that measure the market loss to the land itself.73 Alternatively,
consequential damages are “‘losses that do not flow directly and immediately from
an injurious act but that result indirectly from the act.”74 These damages measure
the “consequences” occurring from an injury, such as a loss in profits resulting
from damage to land, as opposed to the general damages of the loss in the value of
the land itself.75
Historically, consequential damages have been suspect as a recoverable measure of damages in all contexts.76 These suspicions arise from a belief that consequential damages are “more speculative, less certain, more remote, and more
likely to have been avoidable if the plaintiff had been more diligent.”77 Because of
this hostility toward consequential damages, certain limitations on their recoverability have emerged to help combat the distrust of these damages.78
First, the plaintiff must prove consequential damages with reasonable certainty,
by providing evidence that the damages were caused in fact or are reasonably
likely to occur.79 The standard of reasonable certainty ensures that the damages are
not speculative.80 Second, the plaintiff must show that the damages were proximately caused by the harm.81 Proximate cause further ensures that the damages are
not too remote from the defendant’s action.82 Finally, the damages must be shown
to be a distinct harm, rather than merely an additional method of measuring the
general damages incurred.83 If the consequential losses merely provide an alternative measure of general damages, they result in an impermissible double recovery

71. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
72. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (9th ed. 2009). General damages are also known as direct
damages. Id.
73. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.12(2) (2d ed. 1993).
74. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445-46 (9th ed. 2009). Consequential damages are those that are
“[c]onsequent upon but distinct from [the] harm. . . .” DOBBS, supra note 73, § 3.3(4).
75. See DOBBS, supra note 73, § 3.3(4).
76. See LAYCOCK, supra note 36, at 58–59.
77. Id. at 59.
78. See DOBBS, supra note 73, § 3.3(4).
79. Id. §§ 3.4, 5.12(1).
80. See id. § 3.4.
81. Id. In contract cases, consequential damages must meet the Hadley v. Baxendale standard, which
requires that the consequential damages claimed were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at
the time the contract was formed. Id. However, this standard usually would not arise in a condemnation case,
as there is no contract at issue.
82. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009) (defining proximate cause as “[a]n act or
omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actor . . . [a] cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred.”).
83. Id. § 5.12(1).

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\40-3\NMX302.txt

Summer 2010]

unknown

Seq: 9

STRIKING A BALANCE IN THE VALUATION

31-MAY-11

12:03

345

to the plaintiff and are therefore only recoverable if they measure a distinct loss
from the general damages.84
2. Consequential Damages in Takings Cases
Consequential damages, including awards of lost profits, may be recoverable
when private parties cause harm to a plaintiff’s land.85 However, in the takings
context, consequential damages have historically been precluded as a recoverable
damage.86 There are five reasons for this distinction, four of which are grounded in
the historical development surrounding consequential damages and takings.
The first reason that has been propounded concerns the development of takings
law. Historically, takings did not give rise to consequential damages because land
taken by the government was usually undeveloped or unclaimed.87 Taking this type
of land usually did not incur consequential losses for the condemnee.88 Because of
the nature of these early takings, there was a lack of consideration of consequential losses in the original formulation of measurements of “just compensation” to
which many courts adhere today.89
The second reason that has been offered suggested that the Fifth Amendment
does not require compensation for consequential losses.90 This theory determines
that consequential damages are not part of the taking affected and therefore are
not “taken” by the government.91 Because these damages are not part of the actual
“taking,” there is no requirement for compensation by the government.92
The third historical reason that consequential damages are precluded in takings
arises from the general aversion to consequential damages as an award for damage
to property.93 When consequential damages were first considered with respect to
property rights, the courts determined that they were too intangible to give rise to
damages in relation to property.94 While courts later began awarding consequential
damages in other property actions, they nonetheless held on to the antiquated notion that consequential damages were unrecoverable in eminent domain.95
In addition to the three arguments usually discussed, there is another historical
argument that could be made for the preclusion of consequential damages. A possible analogy exists in comparing condemnation to the tort of conversion. In conversion, when a tortfeasor takes a chattel from its rightful owner, the tortfeasor
must pay the rightful owner damages for the value of the chattel, essentially result-

84. Id. § 5.12(2).
85. Id. § 5.12(1).
86. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
87. Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 65
(1957).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid, II, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437, 441–43 (1962).
91. Id. at 442–43.
92. Id.; see also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment
does not require any award for consequential damages arising from a condemnation.”).
93. Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra note 87, at
66–67; see also supra Part II.D.1.
94. Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra note 87, at 66.
95. Id. at 66–67.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\40-3\NMX302.txt

346

unknown

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Seq: 10

31-MAY-11

12:03

[Vol. 40

ing in a forced sale.96 Conversion historically prevented the recovery of consequential damages resulting from the action and only allowed recovery of the fair
market value of the chattel.97 Similar to conversion, in traditional condemnation,
the taking essentially results in a forced sale of the property.
However, unlike modern takings law, modern conversion law has recognized
that lost profits are recoverable as a consequential damage in all but one jurisdiction.98 Further, in temporary takings the circumstance does not resemble a forced
sale of the land as in a traditional condemnation, but rather it provides compensation for interference with the right of an owner to use his own land.99 Therefore,
based on the current state of the law, the analogy to conversion does not rationally
extend to the preclusion of consequential damages in temporary takings, nor does
the analogy support the preclusion in traditional condemnation.
In addition to the historical arguments developing from the history of takings
and consequential losses, courts have also denied recovery of consequential damages on the grounds that they are too “speculative.”100 Courts have rationalized
that awarding consequential damages in takings would result in exaggerated
awards because these losses are more difficult to measure with certainty.101 Because courts are attempting to be mindful of the taxpayer in striking a fair measurement, they have determined that consequential damages should not be
recoverable when the market value award can secure a more “objective”
measure.102
Relying on the theory that the Fifth Amendment does not require compensation for consequential losses, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that consequential
damages are not recoverable in condemnation cases.103 In United States v. General
Motors Corp., the Court noted that consequential damages could be considered in
calculating market value, as they would likely be used in determining the price an
owner would accept for the property; however, they were not awardable as individual damages in condemnation cases.104 The Court stated that where the government is compensating for a taking, “compensation for that interest does not
include future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixtures and personal property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in the location of the land, or other like consequential losses. . . .”105
3. Lost Profits in Takings Cases
Lost profits are usually considered consequential, and have therefore been precluded as a recoverable award in takings.106 Furthermore, a business is not consid-

96. Damages—Measure of Damages—Trover for Conversion of Goods in Transit, 21 HARV. L. REV.
629, 629 (1908) (citing Seymour v. Ives, 46 Conn. 109 (1878)).
97. Id.
98. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 130 (2004).
99. See supra Part II.A.2.
100. Id. at 70–71.
101. Id. at 71.
102. Id.
103. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1945).
104. Id. at 380.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 379–80.
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ered to be property covered under the Fifth Amendment’s protection.107 Due to
this, a condemnee is usually not entitled to recover losses to his business resulting
from a taking.108 Therefore, in apportioning takings damages regarding a business
property, the value of a business is usually only considered as a factor in determining market value of the property.109 Additionally, lost profits resulting from the
taking of a new business are considered to be far too speculative to award because
of the usual lack of evidence that the business would have been profitable had the
business proceeded without the taking’s occurrence.110
Several cases illustrate courts’ treatment of the recoverability of economic damages resulting from a taking. In Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, the
condemnee requested lost profits from gold that existed on the property, but had
never been extracted at the date of the taking.111 The court determined that this
was the exact type of speculative, consequential damage intended to be precluded
in takings cases.112 The court noted that although this was a potentially valuable
use of the property, it was highly speculative whether the gold would have been
extracted, and if it were taken out, what value it might have had at that time.113
Further illustrating the federal courts’ aversion to consequential damages in eminent domain is the case of Mitchell v. United States.114 In Mitchell, the government
condemned land that was used for a corn cannery.115 After the taking of his property, the condemnee was unable to start a corn cannery elsewhere because no suitable land was available for that purpose at the time his property was taken.116 The
Court held that the lost profits from the loss of the corn cannery were not recoverable and only awarded the market value of the taken land.117 The Court reasoned
that the lost profits were unrecoverable because the unavailability of corn cannery
land was a consequential incident and not a direct result of the taking by the
government.118
However, in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
measured just compensation by the going-concern value, a type of economic damage measuring business losses.119 In Kimball, the government condemned a laundry
business for temporary use by the military during World War II.120 The Court determined that the going-concern value of the condemnee’s business was the proper
measure of damages because the government’s temporary occupation of the business effectively denied the condemnee the ability to open a laundry elsewhere.121
The going-concern value of the laundry business to the condemnee included steady

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra Part II.D.2.
4 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 13.13(1).
Id.
Id. § 13.13(6).
See 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1583.
Id.
267 U.S. 341 (1925).
Id. at 343.
Id.
See id. at 345–46.
Id. at 345.
338 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1949).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 15.
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and established patronage and other assets for which a rental value award would
not compensate.122 The Court therefore determined that market rental value would
fail to measure the condemnee’s loss, because the owner was essentially deprived
of the value of the laundry business itself during the temporary period of the taking.123 Normally, in a permanent taking of property, any business on the property
could be moved elsewhere, but here the business was occupied and a deviation
from market rental value was required to provide full compensation.124 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Kimball represents an exception to the federal courts’
aversion to lost profits. The exception allows economic loss damages when there is
a temporary taking and the taking is for the use of a business itself.125
Some states have taken action to allow compensation for economic losses in
state condemnation actions. Certain state legislatures have passed statutes allowing for recovery of economic losses under specific circumstances, while other
states have allowed for their recovery under precedent.126 Finally, one state has
amended its constitution to specifically expand just compensation to include business losses.127
Florida’s legislature has passed a statute allowing for recovery of business losses
if a portion of the property is condemned for a right of way, but excluding business
losses if the entire property is condemned.128 Vermont’s legislature has similarly
provided for business losses limited to takings resulting from the construction of
highways.129 In addition, both California and Wyoming have adopted a section of
the Uniform Eminent Domain Code that provides for the loss of goodwill in takings damages.130 Louisiana also amended its state constitution in 1974 to allow for
compensation for business losses. Its state constitution now requires that a condemnee be compensated “to the full extent of his loss.”131 The caselaw interpreting
the constitutional provision has provided that Louisiana condemnees are now entitled to business losses resulting from condemnation, including lost profits.132
The Georgia Supreme Court has required compensation for business losses in
order to meet its state constitutional requirement of just compensation.133 Further,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed compensation for going-concern value
122. See id. at 10.
123. Id. at 16.
124. See id. at 10, 15.
125. See Oswald, supra note 23, at 315–19.
126. See id. at 322–54.
127. See id. at 354–62.
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071(3)(b) (West 2002); see also Oswald, supra note 23, at 322–26.
129. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 501(2) (1995); see also Oswald, supra note 23, at 326–29.
130. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-713 (1981); Oswald,
supra note 23, at 329–34 (discussing Uniform Eminent Domain Code: Official Text with Comments § 1016
(1974)).
131. LA. CONST. art 1, § 4 (“In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the provisions
of this Section . . . the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the full extent of loss shall include, but not be limited to, the appraised value of the
property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner
because of the expropriation.”).
132. See Marisa Fegan, Comment, Just Compensation Standards and Eminent Domain Injustices: An
Underexamined Connection and Opportunity for Reform, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 295 (2007) (citing State
ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Constant, 369 So.2d 699 (La. 1979)).
133. See Oswald, supra note 23, at 334–38 (discussing Bowers v. Fulton Cnty., 146 S.E.2d 884, 891 (Ga.
1966)).
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in similar circumstances as Kimball, when a public utility was condemned for its
particular use, or when the taking was only temporary.134 Michigan allows goingconcern recovery when a taking of land prevented a business from relocating or a
location was so unique that transfer of the business was impossible.135 Additionally,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has also allowed recovery of rents lost as a result of
a taking, finding that compensation should be from the standpoint of what the
owner has lost and that rents lost as a result of a taking implicated a compensable
property interest.136 However, there were three dissents in the decision, and a subsequent case has construed the precedent very narrowly, limiting it to its facts.137
Perhaps the most notable state court action with respect to the recoverability of
consequential damages has occurred in Alaska. In State v. Hammer, the Alaska
Supreme Court completely rejected the notion that consequential damages should
be precluded in takings cases at all.138 The court held that consequential damages,
and specifically lost profits, should be awarded in takings cases because they reflect
the actual value of the condemnee’s loss resulting from the taking.139 The court
addressed the commonly advanced arguments that consequential damages are not
part of the taking by the government and are too speculative to award in takings
cases.140 Rejecting these arguments, the court found no sufficient reason purported
in the theories to preclude consequential damages in takings.141 The court determined that there should be no distinction between the availability of consequential
damages for private damage to land and eminent domain.142 The court reasoned
that consequential losses reflected a measure of what was actually lost and therefore should be awarded in order to achieve just compensation.143 Further, the court
determined that the fears of speculative damages would be dissuaded by the requirement that consequential damages be proven with reasonable certainty.144
In addition to Alaska, other states have allowed consequential damages in temporary takings through precedent. The states of California, Georgia, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have all expressly stated in
caselaw that consequential damages may be recoverable in temporary takings
cases.145 In summary, the current state of the law is that the federal courts have
precluded consequential damages as a recoverable damage, although business
losses may be available in a temporary taking or public use of the business itself, as
in Kimball. Most state courts follow the federal courts in precluding consequential
134. See id. at 338–42 (citing State v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1969)).
135. See id. at 342–48 (citing City of Detroit v. Michael’s Prescriptions, 373 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985)).
136. See id. at 347–51 (citing Luber v. Milwaukee County, 177 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1970)).
137. See id. at 349–51 (citing Hasselblad v. City of Green Bay, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)).
138. 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976); see also Oswald, supra note 23, at 351–54.
139. Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824–25.
140. Id. at 823–26.
141. Id. The court also discussed the distinction between the U.S. Constitution and the Alaska Constitution. Id. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Alaska Constitution requires compensation for the taking of personal property. Id. This distinction was another factor in the court’s reasoning and dealt with the argument
that the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment does not require compensation for consequential losses. Id. at
824.
142. See id. at 824–27.
143. See id. at 827.
144. See id. at 824–25.
145. Kemper, supra note 65, at 238–39.
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damages in eminent domain, although others have rejected their preclusion, as
mentioned.
E. New Mexico Takings Law
Before Primetime, New Mexico courts had never unconditionally prohibited lost
profits as a recoverable damage in takings.146 Generally, New Mexico takings law
has been considered to have a broad view of just compensation.147 Just compensation is defined in New Mexico law as “an amount sufficient to cover [the condemnee’s] loss—that is, to make him whole and fully indemnify him.”148 This
language slightly differs from the U.S. Supreme Court’s general approach of only
awarding the full market value in that New Mexico’s approach is to “fully indemnify” the condemnee.149
The New Mexico courts have typically applied the market value approach to the
valuation of takings, although the courts follow the flexible approach when market
value fails to provide an adequate award.150 With respect to partial takings cases in
New Mexico, the measure of damages typically used is the before and after approach.151 For temporary takings, the measure of damages had not been settled
before Primetime.152
Although New Mexico had never directly addressed the availability of lost profits awards in temporary takings before Primetime, the courts had discussed analogous issues. The New Mexico Supreme Court had considered using lost profits as
evidence to assist in ascertaining market value.153 The New Mexico Court of Appeals had additionally once declined to award lost profits in an inverse condemnation action.154
The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the definite plans a condemnee
has for property are a proper consideration in determining market value.155 In Pelletier, the court allowed testimony that the condemnee bought the land for the
146. See infra Part II.E.
147. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 206 P.3d 112, 117.
148. State ex rel. Highway Comm’n v. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 560, 417 P.2d 46, 49 (1966).
149. Although New Mexico’s Constitution mandates just compensation when property is taken, it is
silent to the proper valuation of measurement in any particular circumstance. New Mexico also has a statutory
eminent domain code that provides for other categories of measurement but does not discuss measurement for
temporary takings. For traditional condemnation the “actual value [as of the date a petition of condemnation
is filed] shall be the measure of compensation for all property taken, and also the basis of damages for property not taken but injuriously affected in cases where such damages are legally recoverable.” NMSA 1978,
§ 42A-1-24(A) (1981).
150. Pelletier, 76 N.M. at 560, 417 P.2d at 49 (“When there is a ready market for the property, market
value should be utilized to arrive at the correct amount without need to consider values peculiar to the
owner.” (citing 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.22(2) (Rev. 3d ed. 1964))); id. at 560, 417 P.2d at 50
(“Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule. . . .” (quoting 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.314 (Rev. 3d ed. 1964)).
151. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 206 P.3d at 117.
152. Id. But see id. ¶ 19, 206 P.3d at 118 (“Market rental value seems to us to be a reasonable way to
measure Primetime’s compensable loss. . . .”).
153. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 561–62, 417 P.2d 46, 50.
154. PDR Dev. Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 120 N.M. 224, 227, 900 P.2d 973, 976 (Ct. App. 1995).
155. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 22, 206 P.3d at 119 (citing State ex rel. State Highway Dep’t of N.M.
v. Kistler-Collister Co., 88 N.M. 221, 224, 539 P.2d 611, 614 (1975)); see also El Paso Elec. Co. v. Pinkerton, 96
N.M. 473, 474, 632 P.3d 350, 351 (1981) (allowing testimony of cutting of alfalfa crops in addition to the taking
of the property to indicate that existing crops were damaged in order to help determine what price an owner
would accept in the market to lose the property and crops).
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eventual construction of a convenience store.156 The property owner had secured
the land as an investment because of its adjacent location to a highway.157 The
court found this testimony was relevant for a proper determination of marketable
uses for the land, thereby effecting the determination of its market value for the
valuation of a permanent taking.158 Although it was not a direct award of lost profits, admitting this evidence was indicative of a consideration of future profits in
determining market value of a property.
The New Mexico case that dealt the most directly with the availability of lost
profits in inverse condemnation was PDR Development Corp. v. City of Santa
Fe.159 In PDR, the New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to award lost profits to
a condemnee regarding the wrongful application of a zoning code to its property.160
PDR was in the process of finalizing a contract for the sale of condominium
properties to a developer when the developer learned of a zoning code on the
property. The developer dropped its bid on the contract and the property was
eventually foreclosed upon. PDR filed an action asking for an award of the lost
profits it would have realized from the completion of the contract.161 The court
found that there was a wrongfully applied zoning code and therefore there was a
regulatory taking in inverse condemnation.
In determining damages, the court of appeals declined to award lost profits and
instead awarded a before and after measure of value of the property. This valuation measured the difference between the market rate of return on the property
without the zoning restriction and the market rate with the restriction.162 The court
of appeals held that the loss of the contract was not recoverable because there was
no direct interference with the contract, but rather, the loss was a consequential
result of the zoning code.163 The court noted that recovery of this type of consequential damage was not supported by caselaw and its award would have resulted
in a double recovery to PDR.164 The court reasoned that fair market value already
took into account future lost profits.165
PDR’s holding prevented lost profits in addition to a market value award, but
the court did not discuss if lost profits could alternatively be used as a full measurement of the loss of use and enjoyment. The issue of whether lost profits were recoverable in other circumstances was unclear until Primetime.
III. PRIMETIME HOSPITALITY, INC. V. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE
The following part discusses the progression of the Primetime Hospitality case
through the New Mexico courts. The discussion initially examines the circumstances that led to Primetime Hospitality, Inc. (Primetime) filing suit against the
City of Albuquerque. Following the facts, the discussion tracks the procedural

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

76 N.M. at 560, 417 P.2d at 49.
Id. at 561, 417 P.2d at 50.
Id.
120 N.M. 224, 900 P.2d 973 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 225, 900 P.2d at 974.
Id. at 226, 900 P.2d at 975.
Id. (citing Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 270 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 227, 900 P.2d at 976.
Id.
Id. (citing Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401, 411 (1994)).
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route of the case from the district court up to the appellate level, with an examination of the reasoning and holdings of the respective courts. The part concludes with
an in-depth discussion of the supreme court’s reinstatement of the district court’s
award of lost profits, and its reasoning for so holding.
A. Facts
Primetime was an experienced hotel developer, who specialized in constructing
and opening new hotel franchises.166 In early 2000, Primetime entered into a
franchising agreement with Hilton Inns to build a Hilton Garden Inn near the
Albuquerque airport.167 The franchising agreement required Primetime to complete the construction of the hotel by April 30, 2002, and assessed a liquidated
damages penalty of $385,000 if Primetime failed to do so or otherwise breached
the agreement.168 To facilitate the construction of the hotel, Primetime secured a
construction loan of $4,435,000 to finance the project and hired an architect and
general contractor for $300,000 each.169
Two months after the start of construction, Primetime’s contractor inadvertently
struck a city water line while constructing the underground parking garage that
would serve as the hotel’s structural foundation.170 The water line ruptured, flooding the property and halting construction of the hotel.171 Shortly thereafter, another encroaching city water line was discovered on the property.172 Both water
lines had to be moved before construction could resume.173 The water lines were
relocated and construction was again feasible within 102 days; however, the project
was further delayed by winter weather that had set in during the period of initial
delay.174 When construction was able to resume, Primetime had incurred a total
delay of 140 days in the project.175
B. The District Court’s Decision
Primetime filed a complaint seeking damages for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, for trespass.176 Before trial, the parties agreed to dismiss the trespass
claim, and the City stipulated to liability for the inverse condemnation action.177
Therefore, the only issue that remained unresolved was the measure of damages
owed to Primetime from the City’s admitted temporary taking.178

166. Primetime Hospitality Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 3, 206 P.3d at 114.
167. Id.; Primetime Hospitality Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 2, 168 P.3d 1087, 1089.
168. Id.
169. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 3, 206 P.3d at 114.
170. See id. ¶ 4, 206 P.3d at 114; Plaintiff-Petitioner Primetime Hospitality, Inc.’s Brief-in-Chief at 6, 30,
Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, 206 P.3d 112 (No. 30,543), available at
2007 WL 6680358.
171. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 4, 206 P.3d at 114.
172. Id. ¶ 4, 206 P.3d at 114.
173. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 3, 168 P.3d 1087, 1089.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 4, 206 P.3d at 114.
177. Id. ¶ 5, 206 P.3d at 115.
178. Id.
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The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment alleging different measures of damages to be applied in the case.179 Primetime argued that a full measure
of consequential damages was proper, while the City argued for a before and after
measure of damages.180 The full measure of consequential damages would allow
Primetime to recover the lost profits and excess construction costs incurred as a
result of the water line break.181 Alternatively, the City’s proposed before and after
method would award the difference in the value of the property before the water
line break and after the water line break during the period of the taking.182 The
district court granted Primetime’s motion for summary judgment as to the award
of lost profits, stating that they were a “proper element of damages” and that the
before and after method would not be appropriate to measure Primetime’s loss.183
Relying on this reasoning, the judge awarded Primetime the exact damages that it
had requested, consisting of lost profits in the amount of $456,242 and additional
construction costs in the amount of $153,518.45, both with interest.184
C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
The City appealed the district court’s ruling to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, and Primetime cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.185
The City did not dispute the district court’s finding that the lost profits and additional construction costs were a direct result of the encroaching water lines; rather,
the City argued that lost profits were precluded as a matter of law because they
were consequential damages.186 The City changed its position on appeal from what
it had argued in the district court, recognizing that the before and after measurement of damages might not be adequate to award Primetime just compensation in
the circumstances of the case.187 Instead, the City argued that market rental value
was the appropriate valuation measure under the circumstances.188
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s award of lost
profits.189 The court of appeals determined that the district court had erred in directly awarding the lost profits, because they represented consequential damages
that were precluded in takings cases.190 The court determined that lost profits could
be properly considered in the calculation of damages, but should not be awarded

179. Primetime, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 5, 168 P.3d at 1090.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. ¶ 1, 168 P.3d at 1089.
185. Id.
186. See Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 7, 206 P.3d 112, 115.
187. Respondent’s Answer Brief at 1, Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC011, 206 P.3d 112 (No. 30,543), available at 2008 WL 6487112.
188. Primetime, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 26, 168 P.3d at 1195.
189. Id. ¶ 54, 168 P.3d at 1100. The court also affirmed the award of excess construction costs, with one
exception in reversing the award of construction costs for a buttress wall constructed to mitigate damage. Id.
The court of appeals remanded this award to determine if this was a reasonable mitigation measure. Primetime, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 26, 168 P.3d at 1095. In addition, the court of appeals vacated the award of costs
from Primetime’s expert, remanding for a determination by the district court that the expert aided in determining the value of the taking. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 7, 206 P.3d at 115.
190. Primetime, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 33, 168 P.3d at 1096.
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independently.191 Rather, the court held that the use of lost profits should be limited as a factor in the calculation of rental value based on what the landowner
would accept to lose those profits.192 The court determined that the proper valuation method was “[w]hat . . . an objective property owner [would] accept to delay
construction of a hotel facility in this circumstance for a period of 142 days,” and
remanded for the district court to determine this measure.193
D. The Supreme Court’s Decision
Primetime sought appellate review from the Supreme Court of New Mexico
after the court of appeals reversed the district court decision. Primetime requested
reversal of the court of appeals’ determination that lost profits were precluded as a
direct award.194 The supreme court ruled in favor of Primetime, reversing the court
of appeals and holding that “lost profits may be recovered when they are the best
measure of the value of the lost use and enjoyment of condemned land.”195 The
supreme court looked to New Mexico and federal takings law in determining that
the lost profits were a proper award under the circumstances. The court also examined whether the lost profits were awarded as consequential damages in this
case, based on the effect of their characterization as a direct result in the unchallenged district court finding.
1. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The New Mexico Supreme Court sought to determine whether the district court
had awarded a proper measure of compensation which would justly compensate
Primetime under the circumstances of the case. The court initially examined New
Mexico precedent’s general interpretation of just compensation, discussing the
previously employed approaches to valuing different types of takings in New Mexico.196 The court noted that in a permanent total taking, the measure of damages
would be the fair market value of the property on the date of the taking.197 Further,
the court noted that in partial permanent takings cases, the legislature has pro191. Id. ¶ 40, 168 P.3d at 1098.
192. Id.
193. Id. ¶ 41, 168 P.3d at 1098. The court was also careful to note that it would not create a measure to
be used in all takings cases and adhered to the flexible approach of valuation for eminent domain. Id. ¶ 22, 168
P.3d at 1094.
194. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 9, 206 P.3d at 116. It also requested reversal of the excess construction costs and expert witness costs, which are not discussed in this note. Id.
195. Id. ¶ 2, 206 P.3d at 114. With respect to the excess construction costs, the court held that they were
additionally recoverable because they had directly resulted from the damage caused by the taking. Id. The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of constructions costs, because of the unchallenged finding that they were a direct result of the taking. Id. ¶ 41, 206 P.3d at 125. The court agreed with the
court of appeals and held the costs were similar to the repair and restoration damages that were properly
awarded by the U.S. Supreme Court in General Motors and Kimball and those provided for in New Mexico
partial takings cases under UJI 13-705 NMRA. Id. ¶ 39, 206 P.3d at 125. In addition, the court reversed the
court of appeals on the issue of the buttress wall, because it was also a direct result under the unchallenged
finding. Id. ¶¶ 42–43, 206 P.3d at 124–25. The court found that the testimony at trial demonstrated that the
cost of the wall was less than the amount of days that the construction would have been further delayed
without the mitigation efforts of building the wall. Id. ¶ 43, 206 P.3d at 125. With respect to the expert witness
costs, the court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because the lost profits were a proper award the
expert testimony was “reasonably necessary” and therefore should be compensated. Id. ¶ 44, 206 P.3d at 125.
196. Id. ¶ 15, 206 P.3d at 117.
197. Id.
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vided that the difference in the fair market value of the property resulting from the
taking is recoverable, a before and after measurement.198 The court ultimately determined that based on these valuation measures, the trend in New Mexico law
was to treat just compensation broadly.199 The court additionally noted that a standard measure for valuing temporary takings had not been settled in New Mexico
law.200
The supreme court turned next to the court of appeals’ holding, examining
whether the rental value measure identified by the court of appeals was an appropriate award of damages in the case. The supreme court agreed that market rental
value is an appropriate way to measure damages in temporary takings.201 However,
the court noted that awarding market rental value “raises as many questions as it
answers” in determining the proper award of damages under these circumstances.202 In particular, the rental value measurement could potentially range from
the value of the land at the time of the taking (a partially excavated lot) to the
rental value of a fully functioning hotel.203 Therefore, the court determined that the
damages valuation was not resolved by assessing the market rental value because
the property’s actual value for rental did not reflect its value to the condemnee at
the time of the taking.204
The court turned to New Mexico and federal decisions to attempt to determine
an appropriate method of valuation to justly compensate Primetime’s loss. The
court first looked to PDR Development Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, a New Mexico
decision dealing with lost profits. In PDR, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that lost profits were not recoverable in an inverse condemnation action where a
temporary regulatory taking occurred while the condemnee was in negotiations for
the sale of the property to a condominium developer.205 The Primetime court found
that PDR did not necessarily control in the facts of Primetime, as Primetime dealt
with a total physical taking as opposed to the regulatory taking in PDR.206 Further,
the court noted that Primetime was distinguishable from PDR because the PDR
court explicitly ruled that the loss of the contract was not a direct result of the
government action, whereas here, the lost profits were found to be a direct result
by the district court, a finding that was unchallenged on appeal.207
Finding that PDR did not provide an appropriate measure for the circumstances
in the case, the court turned to two federal cases similar to Primetime for guidance
in valuing this type of loss.208 In United States v. 883.39 Acres, the 8th Circuit Court
198. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.2.
199. Id. Interestingly, this was contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals upon examination of
New Mexico caselaw regarding just compensation. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007NMCA-129, ¶ 33, 168 P.3d 1087, 1097.
200. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 206 P.3d at 117.
201. Id. ¶ 19, 206 P.3d at 118.
202. Id. ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118.
203. Id. ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118–19.
204. See id.
205. See id. ¶¶ 16–17, 206 P.3d at 117 (discussing PDR Dev. Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 120 N.M. 224, 900
P.2d 973 (Ct. App. 1995)); see also supra Part II.E.
206. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 16–17, 206 P.3d at 117; see also supra Part II.E.
207. Id. ¶ 26, 206 P.3d at 121. New Mexico appellate rules of procedure dictate that findings of the trial
court that are unchallenged on appeal are binding on the appellate court. Rule 12-213 NMRA; see also Cordova v. Broadbent, 107 N.M. 215, 216, 755 P.2d 59, 60 (1988).
208. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118–19.
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of Appeals refused to consider evidence of potential commercial value of undeveloped pastureland based on the owner’s intentions to commercialize the property.209
Rather, the court awarded the value of similar undeveloped land.210 The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that the construction site in Primetime was distinguishable from the pastureland in 883.39 Acres because the construction project in
Primetime had undergone substantial planning and was in the process of physical
construction.211
In the second federal case, United States v. 37.15 Acres of Land, the Federal
District Court of California awarded an operating hotel its specific, normally generated earnings during the period of the taking.212 The district court calculated the
time period during which the hotel was rendered inoperable as a result of the taking and made the proper adjustments according to fluctuations in market conditions.213 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Primetime was also
distinguishable from 37.15 Acres, because the property at issue in Primetime was
far from an operable hotel with evidence of specific earnings.214
The court stated that rental value would be easy to determine in either of the
federal cases discussed, but because the property at issue in Primetime was neither
a completely undeveloped property, nor a fully functioning hotel, rental market
value in this context would not reflect the condemnee’s loss.215 The market rental
value would be measured by an empty lot or a partially excavated lot that was
likely worth less than the value at the time of purchase, and neither would represent the actual loss that Primetime incurred as a result of the taking.216
Turning to the damages in Primetime, the supreme court further emphasized
that just compensation must be determined from the standpoint of what the condemnee has lost.217 Disagreeing with the court of appeals’ determination that the
district court had not awarded an objective measure of damages, the supreme
court determined that the lost profits were a measure of the land’s market rental
value to Primetime.218
Because the court determined the lost profits were the measure of market rental
value in Primetime, it turned to a range of precedent from federal and state courts
that had discussed the issue of the recoverability of consequential damages in eminent domain to determine if the lost profits were properly recoverable in this
case.219 Ultimately, the court determined that the award of lost profits and construction costs in Primetime were by their nature non-consequential.220 The court
209. 442 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir. 1971).
210. Id.
211. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118.
212. 77 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
213. See id.
214. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 119.
215. Id. ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118–19.
216. Id. ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 118.
217. Id. ¶ 23, 206 P.3d at 120.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶¶ 24–32, 206 P.3d at 119–23. The court of appeals and the supreme court both noted that
earlier New Mexico cases that used the term consequential damages to refer to “injuries to adjacent property,
such as loss of access to roads, when a parcel of land is taken” dealt with a different sense of the term “consequential,” which was not at issue in Primetime. Id. ¶ 25 n.2, 206 P.3d at 120; see also Primetime, 2007-NMCA129, ¶¶ 31–32, 168 P.3d at 1096.
220. See Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 25–33, 206 P.3d at 120–23.
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held that the unchallenged finding that the lost profits were a direct result of the
taking mandated that the damages were not consequential, but rather the actual
measure of what Primetime had lost.221
In determining that lost profits were appropriate under the circumstances in
Primetime, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the notion held in other jurisdictions that lost profits can never be recoverable in takings cases. The court discussed several cases that held that lost profits should not be available in takings
cases whether they are characterized as consequential or non-consequential.222
These cases precluded lost profits specifically on the grounds that they would result in a double recovery if awarded with a market value award, are speculative,
and are a consequential damage.223 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the
principle that precludes consequential damages in eminent domain when the damages are purely speculative or would result in a double recovery, but determined in
Primetime that the damages were not subject to these concerns.224 The court further determined that there would be no double recovery because the lost profits
were the only damage awarded, and therefore no separate award of property value
could be recovered.225 In addition, the fact that the direct result finding was unchallenged prevented any argument that the damages were speculative.226 Further, the
court determined that the lost profits were not awarded as consequential damages
by the district court, but rather as a method of measuring rental value.227 Based on
this principle, the court ultimately developed the holding that where “lost profits
are the best evidence of the taken property’s value . . . they should be the measure of just compensation.”228
The court reasoned that the lost profits were the best evidence of the value of
just compensation under the circumstances by looking to several factors.229 First,
the court analogized Primetime to Kimball, where the Supreme Court found that
the temporary deprivation of a laundry business deprived the owner of an ability
to conduct his business elsewhere.230 Likewise, in Primetime, the nature of the taking prevented Primetime from doing anything but suffering the loss because there
was no option but to wait for the water to be cleared and the water lines moved.231

221. Id. ¶ 23, 206 P.3d at 119.
222. Id. ¶ 27–32, 206 P.3d at 120–22.
223. Id. ¶ 27–31, 206 P.3d at 120–22 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 343 (1925) (consequential damages should be precluded in eminent domain); Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d
1577, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (lost profits are too speculative); Wheeler v. Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 268–69
(11th Cir. 1987) (double recovery)).
224. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30, 206 P.3d at 121.
225. Id. ¶ 28, 206 P.3d at 121.
226. Id. ¶ 30, 206 P.3d at 121.
227. Id. ¶ 32, 206 P.3d at 122. The court cited several state cases that held that lost profits could be used
in determining what an appropriate rental value would be for property. Id. (citing Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal
v. City of New York, 139 F.2d 1007, 1013 (2d Cir. 1944); Keystone Assoc. v. State, 433 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700 (Ct.
Cl. 1980); Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 43 S.E.2d 10, 19 (Va. 1947)).
228. Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 32, 206 P.3d at 122.
229. Id. ¶ 33, 206 P.3d at 122–23.
230. Id. ¶ 33, 206 P.3d at 122 (discussing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 12–13
(1949)).
231. Id.
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Additionally, in Primetime there was an unchallenged finding of fact that the
taking directly deprived Primetime of nearly $500,000 in lost profits.232 Therefore,
the court found that this loss was the actual measure of damages that Primetime
suffered, and the proper award to fully indemnify Primetime.233 Further, the court
found that the damages that were requested would not result in a double recovery
of lost profits and market value, but were the actual measure of the loss of use and
enjoyment.234 The lost profits were awarded as the measurement of just compensation and no additional “consequential” award was recovered.235 Therefore, there
was no issue with a potential for double recovery, which distinguished Primetime
from Wheeler, a federal case in which both consequential and general damages
were sought.236 Because of these factors, the court determined that the amount
awarded was a proper award of lost profits under the circumstances of the case.237
2. The Holding of Primetime
The supreme court agreed with the determination of both the district court and
the court of appeals that damages should be valued from the standpoint of what
the condemnee had lost.238 However, the supreme court rejected the court of appeals’ determination that the district court did not award an objective standard for
the measure of damages in awarding lost profits.239 The supreme court determined
that the district court had not intended to award consequential damages, but
rather, had awarded lost profits as a measure of the actual loss that Primetime
suffered as a direct result of the taking.240 Additionally, because the lost profits
were characterized as non-consequential damages based on the unchallenged direct result finding, the lost profits were a permissible award to the condemnee.241
Therefore, the supreme court determined that the district court had properly compensated Primetime for the taking, and there was no reason to remand the case.242
The supreme court limited its holding by stating that it did not intend to determine the recoverability of lost profits, nor whether they will accurately reflect the
value of a temporary taking in other circumstances.243 However, the holding does
remain from Primetime that lost profits are recoverable when they can be shown to
be the best measure of the loss of the use and enjoyment of a temporarily condemned property.244 Ultimately, the court affirmed the principle that consequential

232. Id.
233. Id. ¶ 33, 206 P.3d at 122–23.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 28, 206 P.3d at 121 (discussing Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir.
1987), and the adoption of its valuation measure in PDR Dev. Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 120 N.M. 224, 900 P.2d
273 (Ct. App. 1995), in which a double recovery would have resulted by awarding lost profits because the
“market rate of return measure” already takes into account fluctuations in market expectations).
237. Id. ¶ 33, 206 P.3d at 122.
238. Id. ¶¶ 21–22, 206 P.3d at 119.
239. Id. ¶¶ 23, 34–35, 206 P.3d at 119, 123.
240. Id. ¶ 35, 206 P.3d at 123 (stating that the award of lost profits and excess construction costs was
“intended as a measure of the lost use and possession of the property . . . a[n actual] measure of rental
value.”).
241. Id. ¶ 34, 206 P.3d at 123.
242. Id. ¶ 23, 206 P.3d at 119.
243. Id. ¶ 36, 206 P.3d at 123.
244. Id. ¶ 2, 206 P.3d at 114.
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damages should be precluded in takings. However, the court held that when lost
profits are the best measure of the loss of the use and enjoyment, they can be used
as the measurement of the direct award so long as they are not independently
awarded.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMETIME DECISION AND
ITS IMPACT ON NEW MEXICO LAW
Primetime effectively settled that lost profits may be available as a measurement
of damages in inverse condemnation cases in New Mexico.245 However, the extent
to which the holding is usable remains to be seen. The court greatly limited its
holding, and it seems likely that Primetime will be limited to its facts.
A. Primetime Effectively Adhered to a Flexible Approach of Valuing Damages
in Takings Law
Although the holding of Primetime may not be particularly usable in other contexts, the court nonetheless benefited New Mexico takings law by adhering to a
flexible approach to valuing takings. It is important for New Mexico courts to preserve the flexibility in takings law because one strict measure of damages would
likely result in windfalls to some plaintiffs and deprivation of just compensation to
others.246 Although flexibility does not provide plaintiffs with a great deal of certainty regarding their potential award, this uncertainty is offset by the benefits provided. Condemnation law is not suited for bright line rules and the flexible
approach towards the valuation of takings affords greater policy considerations in
ensuring accurate awards to individual plaintiffs while protecting the balance between apportioning the burden of loss between the public and the individual condemnee.247 The court in Primetime wisely adhered to this rule, while slightly
expanding the measurement of takings.
B. Lost Profits in the Valuation of Takings Damages
Using lost profits as a valuation method in determining rental value can result in
vastly different awards for condemnees.248 Primetime would have received inadequate compensation had the market value been assessed using a before and after
approach.249 Additionally, a market rental value award would not have reflected
the value of the property to Primetime.250 Neither of these methods would have
accurately measured Primetime’s substantial loss of profits that in fact resulted
from the delay of the hotel project that it had undertaken.
Primetime lost the value of time when it could have been constructing its hotel.
Primetime was not interested in using the property as a vacant construction lot and
had very real plans that were underway in developing the hotel. In addition,
Primetime undoubtedly lost profits in the 142 days that the hotel was delayed in
245. Id. (“[L]ost profits may be recovered when they are the best measure of the use and enjoyment of
the condemned land.”).
246. See 3 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.06(1); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
247. See 3 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.06(1).
248. See supra Part II.E.
249. See supra Part III.D.1.
250. See id.
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opening. Under the circumstances in this case, valuing the loss of use by market
rental value determined from an award of lost profits was a fair measure of loss
that resulted from the condemnation.
C. The Nature of the Limited Holding in Primetime
Primetime held that lost profits can be awarded when they are the best measure
of the loss to the condemnee. However, based on the court’s reasoning, it seems
that lost profits will rarely be considered the best measure of valuation in future
condemnation cases. The court’s determination that the award of lost profits was
permissible in Primetime relied heavily on two factors: (1) the unchallenged finding of the district court that the lost profits were a direct result of the taking, and
(2) the unique circumstances of the taking involved in the case.251 The reliance on
these factors limits the value of Primetime as precedent in the future.
The repeated reliance on the unchallenged direct loss finding does not change
the general aversion to awarding consequential damages in takings law.252 The
court found that it was required to affirm the award of the district court because
they were a direct result, and therefore could not be defined as a consequential
damage.253 The court did not actually award lost profits as consequential damages;
it merely used them as a full measurement of the rental value, clearly intending to
characterize the damages as non-consequential.
D. Should Consequential Damages Be Precluded in Condemnation?
Consequential damages should no longer be precluded in takings cases. The
courts have gone to great lengths in attempting to adhere to the doctrine of consequential damages’ preclusion in eminent domain, but the distinction is meaningless
today. Fair market value measures have been diluted by the court’s need to “justly
compensate” the condemnee while not awarding consequential damages. There is
no longer any real distinction between awarding general and consequential damages in condemnation because of this dilution.254 The circumstance is unavoidable
that certain condemnee’s losses will best be measured by using consequential and
incidental losses, particularly when the taking is of a business. In all practicality,
consequential damages should be allowed so courts will no longer need to bend the
rules, using consequential damages to “measure” market value, merely because of
an antiquated aversion to consequential damages in condemnation.255
Additionally, consequential damages awarded in takings would be subject to
normal damages limitations and therefore would not pose a risk of exaggerated
awards to condemnees. Recoverable damages for condemnation must be direct
and certain, and cannot be remote or speculative.256 General damages rules will
251. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 12, 20, 206 P.3d 112, 116,
119.
252. See supra Part III.D.2.
253. See id.
254. See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra note 87, at
84–85.
255. Id. at 96 (“Separate appraisal of incidental losses would also make the basic market valuation a
more operable standard. Manipulation of that formula to include such losses would no longer be necessary;
thus the objectivity originally justifying its use would be restored.”).
256. See supra Part II.D.1.
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prevent the condemnee from securing a double recovery and prevent the taxpayer
from paying more than the actual loss of the condemnee. The condemnee is entitled to be compensated for the full amount of his loss under both the U.S. and New
Mexico Constitutions, and this compensation should include consequential damages. Adhering to the limitations on the recoverability of damages could allay any
fears that the consequential damages would exceed a condemnee’s loss and result
in a windfall.
The Primetime court could have better benefited New Mexico takings law by
stating what it was actually doing: awarding consequential damages. The court
went through the limitations on consequential damages, finding that there was no
double recovery and that the damages were not speculative, but vehemently insisted that the lost profits awarded in the case were non-consequential.257 In order
to justly compensate Primetime, the court had to award lost profits, and rather
than broadening takings law to include consequential damages when they are necessary for “just compensation,” the court masked the lost profits award as a measurement of market value and thus, defined it as a non-consequential award.
Instead, the court should have taken the extra step in allowing awards of lost profits as a consequential damage when lost profits will most accurately reflect just
compensation, not just when there is a finding that the profits were a direct result
of the taking, and non-consequential.
E. Where Should the Line be Drawn in Awarding Lost Profits?
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court in Primetime were careful to
prevent the creation of a measure to be used in all takings cases and to avoid
setting a precedent for the common use of lost profits in the future.258 The courts
were prudent in adhering to the flexible approach to valuation of condemnation
damages, while not endorsing lost profits as a common method of valuation.259
However, lost profits should be available under certain limitations. Lost profits can
reflect the best measurement of the value of the property to the owner, especially
in cases in which the market for a property fails to adequately measure its value.
In circumstances such as Primetime, in which the rental value of the property in
the market would never equal its worth to the condemnee, lost profits should be a
permissible award. Although the courts are rightfully mindful of attempting to
achieve a fair balance between the condemnee and the public, when it is a close
call, the public should bear the loss.260 Condemnees should not suffer inadequate
compensation merely because their actual loss is characterized as “consequential.”261 Individuals whose property is condemned should be placed in as good a

257. See supra Part III.D.1.
258. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 206 P.3d 112, 123.
259. Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-129, ¶ 22, 168 P.3d 1087, 1094.
260. See 3 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 8.01(2) (“[B]alancing the benefits to the public against the right of
the owner does not serve to qualify the latter’s right to compensation. The owner is not required to subsidize a
public project.”); Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra note 87, at
96 (“Ultimately, the public which benefits from improvements should bear the incidental losses occasioned by
any condemnation for which just compensation is required; no reason appears for placing an inordinate burden on the individuals whose property is appropriated for the public benefit.”).
261. See Primetime, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 24, 206 P.3d at 120 (citing Spies & McCoid, supra note 90, at
449) (“Fundamental fairness dictates that individuals who suffer consequential loss ought to be compensated.
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position as they would have been had the taking not occurred, and when lost profits can be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty and reflect the best measure of the condemnee’s loss, they should be recoverable.
Lost profits should be precluded in condemnation cases when they fail to meet
the limitations on consequential damages. This would occur when they cannot be
proven with reasonable certainty, result in a double recovery, or are too speculative. The taxpayer should not be forced to pay for damages that do not adhere to
these limitations, and would therefore result in a windfall to plaintiffs. However, if
the condemnee can prove his lost profits under the strict limitations to consequential recovery, the damages should be awarded.262 This strategy would provide the
adequate balance in justly compensating the condemnee, while protecting the taxpayer from compensating unfounded damages.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Primetime is an interesting case in remedies and property law, it likely
will not drastically change takings awards in New Mexico. The market rental value
and before and after approaches to valuing temporary takings will prevail, with
arguments for lost profits generally being denied as speculative and remote. The
decision was just, providing Primetime a fair award of its loss and placing it in the
position it would have been had the taking not occurred, but the case will likely be
limited to its facts as a precedent for future cases.
Nonetheless, the availability of lost profits as a measurement of value for condemnation is an important theory to be recognized in New Mexico takings law.
This measurement provides an alternative to the standard methods of valuation
should they fail to justly compensate plaintiffs in future cases. Although it is likely
that the lost profits valuation measure will rarely be used, Primetime was a valuable development in this area of the law, and reflective of the courts’ efforts to
extend greater protection to constitutional goals of preventing condemnation without just compensation. Perhaps in the future, consequential losses will be recoverable to fully compensate condemnees in takings cases, and they will no longer have
to be masked as a “direct award” in adherence to the antiquated aversion to consequential damages.

In disallowing recovery for many such losses the law is unfair in two different but related respects. First, it
discriminates between those on whom loss from eminent domain falls. Some are compensated; some are not.
Secondly, it requires those who suffer uncompensated injuries to bear directly and in undue proportion the
economic expense of projects designed to benefit the public.”).
262. See supra Part II.D.1.

